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Essay代写范文:American institutional hegemony 2019-04-03

今天论文代写机构Fanessay小编整理了一篇Essay代写范文--American institutional hegemony,本篇文章阐述的内容关于美国制度霸权。第二次世界大战后,美国实施西欧马歇尔计划的过程实际上是保护本国经济、最大限度地提高国家利益的过程。美国不仅要求西欧国家将援助的“必要条件”列入总报告,而且必须反映在双方签署的一系列双边协定和1948年《对外援助法》中。然而,在执行马歇尔计划的过程中,美国附加了许多苛刻的条件。这样,美国的霸权与受援国的主权发生了激烈的碰撞。然而,由于西欧国家希望美国在战后经济重建中提供援助,因此他们必须以牺牲主权为代价。


After World War II, the process of the United States implementing the Marshall plan for Western Europe was actually the process of protecting its domestic economy and maximizing its national interests. The United States not only requires western European countries to include the "necessary conditions" of aid in the general report, but also must be reflected in a series of bilateral agreements signed by the two sides and the foreign aid act of 1948. However, in the process of implementing the Marshall plan, the United States attached many harsh conditions. In this way, the hegemony of the United States and the sovereignty of the recipient countries have a fierce collision. However, as western European countries looked to the United States for assistance in their post-war economic reconstruction, they had to do so at the expense of their sovereignty.


International political economy theorist Robert gilpin has discussed the meaning of "hegemony" from the perspective of rule making and system control. In his view, the so-called "hegemonic countries" refer to those "countries that are able and willing to formulate and maintain the norms and principles of the free economic order". The success of hegemony largely depends on the hegemonic countries' "ability to impose their will on other countries". The way to achieve hegemony is to establish "a series of rights and rules to control or at least influence the interaction between countries" by concluding international treaties or intergovernmental agreements, so as to seize the dominant power in the process of making international rules and international systems and realize "institutional hegemony". In this system of rights and rules, "dominant actors try their best to maintain their power in order to seek more special interests and impose rules on weaker members". In his book America and its place in the world, Columbia University professor Nathaniel pfeiffer extended gilpin's argument. Needless to say, he argues, America was the only source of free capital after the second world war, and it could impose its will on other countries' post-war reconstruction. In granting or denying loans, it can put pressure on one country to bend the other to America's will.


Mr Pfeiffer's concern is not groundless. It is based on a sober awareness of American self-interest, which is also a concern for recipient countries. Also on the sidelines of the tri-foreign ministers' meeting in Paris, French foreign minister georges piedouard expressed concern that the United States might use aid to interfere with the sovereignty of western European countries. He argued that while Europe had to be bailed out to save itself, "it can only be done without interfering with sovereignty". However, in the eyes of the United States, the aid application from European countries to the United States cannot be a simple "shopping order", and the United States only needs to deliver the goods according to the order, and the aid from the United States must be conditional. It is not enough for western European countries to make commitments such as "efforts to develop production". They must also accept a series of conditions attached to aid and be fixed by law. Later, these conditions were embodied in article 115 of the foreign aid act of 1948. According to the article, recipient countries must make multilateral commitments and assume bilateral obligations with each other, which is the precondition for receiving aid. On this basis, the recipient countries must do the following: first, they must accept and fulfill the commitments made to the United States in the general report, which is the most basic condition. Second, there must be multilateral commitments among western European countries to ensure continued cooperation in recovery programmes. Third, to receive aid under the act, participating countries must sign a bilateral agreement with the United States. Accordingly, section 115 of the foreign aid act of 1948 lists eight specific commitments that European countries have to make directly to the United States. These eight specific commitments are: must strive to develop industrial and agricultural production; Measures must be taken to stabilize the currency, establish an effective exchange rate and balance the budget; Cooperation with other countries is necessary to promote and encourage greater exchange of goods and services; The resources provided by the country and the United States must be used effectively; It must facilitate the purchase of raw materials by the United States for strategic purposes and provide the United States with strategic reserve materials for war industries; A domestic currency equivalent to the United States grant must be deposited in the special account; Quarterly reports must be submitted to the United States on aid program implementation; At the request of the United States, the information relating to the operation of the recovery plan and the use of American aid must be provided to the United States promptly. Beyond that, "in order for Europe to get back on its feet, European countries must be honest about how much resources are available within Europe".


As if these conditions were not enough, section 111 of the foreign aid act of 1948 once again states clearly that in order to promote the achievement of the policy objectives set forth by the United States, "the administrator shall have the authority to add to the terms and conditions of assistance provided for in this act as he deems necessary or appropriate". According to the regulation and the official attitude of the United States before the regulation, the United States attached more aid conditions to western European countries. The country requesting assistance from the United States must be friendly to the United States; Recipient countries must ensure that this is the last time they apply to the United States for aid; The major commodities exported by the recipient country and the economic plans formulated must be approved by the "economic cooperation agency"; In order to protect American industry, European countries should buy as few raw materials as possible from the United States that are in short supply in the United States. The United States government departments, agencies or officials also have no right to export the resources or products that are in short supply in the United States, such as oil, petroleum products, steel, etc. Considering the contribution of the United States to the revival of European countries, Europe should consider sending a certain amount of raw materials to the United States when the production of raw materials increases. European countries should provide the United States with raw materials in shortage or potential shortage in exchange for gifts or loans. Recipient countries must prioritise purchases of us agricultural surpluses; The development and production of strategic materials needed by the United States must be financed with a portion of the United States loan; Must eliminate the tariff barrier, reduces the tariff, in order to benefit the United States and Europe free trade; Exchange controls must be removed or relaxed; Recipient countries must accept the supervision of the United States economically. The United States has the right to know fully about the distribution and use of aid funds and the right to supervise the whole process. To protect the United States maritime industry, the administrator shall have the authority to take such measures as he deems necessary to ensure that at least 50% of the gross tonnage of goods procured in the United States with assistance funds are shipped to Europe by United States merchant ships at market rates; In order to protect the agricultural economy and flour processing industry in the United States, of the wheat and flour shipped to European countries as gifts, not less than 25% of the unprocessed wheat must be processed by the United States and shipped to European countries; In order to encourage foreign countries to take full advantage of the surplus agricultural products in the United States, the secretary of agriculture has the right to add no less than 50% of the profit on the original selling price of grain shipped to Europe. The security of American expatriates' property and investments in Europe must be protected; American labels must be placed on goods destined for recipient countries, which widely advertise American benevolence and generosity, among other things.


Finally, the United States has not forgotten to add the condition of anti-communism, that is, "the recipient countries should continue to devote themselves to the cultivation and support of liberal democracy and oppose the rule of a few people"; "The overall us aid package must be based on European countries ensuring that the communist party does not undermine or misappropriate aid. If we are not satisfied with this, we must ensure that it is possible to terminate assistance immediately." This "misuse" certainly included the flow of production resources to non-marshall plan participants, particularly the Soviet union and eastern European countries. In short, the United States requires recipient countries to exclude or suppress domestic communist forces politically and prevent the outflow of aid funds.


Furthermore, article 118 of the foreign assistance act of 1948 provides that, in determining the modalities and extent of assistance to a participating state, the administrator shall take into account the extent to which that state has fulfilled its commitments to other participating states and to bilateral agreements with the United States pursuant to article 115 of the foreign assistance act. The administrator has the authority to terminate assistance to that country in the event that he considers that: "that country has not complied with a bilateral agreement with the United States pursuant to section 115 of the assistance act, or has deviated from the purpose of United States assistance"; "Because the situation has changed, aid is no longer in the national interest of the United States." This regulation undoubtedly puts a "straitjacket" on the recipient countries. The United States has the right to "terminate aid at any time" if the recipient country fails to meet any of the conditions set by the United States, or if, in the eyes of the United States, the recipient country is unsatisfactory to the United States or obstructs the realization of the national interest of the United States. Such a provision, based entirely on the will of a state and determined by one side according to its own preferences, must be highly arbitrary. And that's what defines America as a nation.


The administration's approach was first criticized by domestic justice groups and activists. For example, the national bar association's commission on international law and international relations, in its report entitled "the European recovery plan and American foreign policy," wrote: "these conditions imposed inevitably and unavoidably involve the United States in the domestic economic and political affairs of recipient countries." Charles Bosch, executive chairman of the methodist world peace commission, also stated in a letter to congress on 15 March 1948 that the methodist church "reaffirms its support for the European recovery plan, but hopes that it is not an extension of American imperialism in Europe". At the same time, the Truman administration's approach, which apparently did not take into account the feelings and emotions of some senators on the senate foreign relations committee, was also criticized by these people. For example, senator George said, "it is unwise to dictate to these countries." Senator hatch agreed: "it is wrong to write tough rules and order these countries, 'you have to do this, you have to do that.'" Even the normally pragmatic senator lodge, referring to the administration's emphasis on the need to remove economic barriers between aid recipients, said: "what we want to do, however, is make them realize that we really want them to come together. But it cannot be said that you will not receive a dollar until you have achieved a degree of union.


But there are plenty of hardliners at American policymaking, too. For example, senate majority leader Arthur vandenberg, who carries a lot of weight in congress, did not change his mind. Since the Europeans themselves had promised to try to do something, he thought, "I don't see why we shouldn't say to them, look, man, this is what you promised to do." As early as June 1947, assistant secretary of state Robert leavitt, in the memorandum prepared for deputy secretary of state William Clayton's negotiation in Britain, vigorously defended the purpose and attached conditions of American aid, deliberately promoted the nobility and selflessness of American aid to Europe, and never mentioned the selfish motives of the United States. The memo concludes: "there is a great deal of disagreement about the purpose and conditions attached to U.S. assistance to European countries. Most of them are silly or unfair, or both. But there is one condition that must be attached to future aid, and with good reason, and that is that the United States will do whatever it takes to make Europe economically viable. Lovett's words confirmed at least two things. First, Americans were prepared to attach conditions to aid around the time Marshall spoke at harvard. Second, these conditions have aroused antipathy and criticism from those concerned. But lovett was wrong when he said that the conditions the United States imposed on Western Europe were not one but a set of conditions.


It can be said that after the us congress reconvened in January 1948, there was a heated debate among the members of congress on whether to attach aid conditions to the Marshall plan. Vandenberg and others stood their ground and insisted on strings attached, while senators George and hatch stood their ground and said there should be no strings attached. After a bitter war of words between the two sides, the latter finally gained the upper hand. Later, when the senate foreign relations committee presented its own bill to the senate, some of the preconditions were removed. However, the bill retains the government's original eight bilateral obligations and requires them to be reflected in formal bilateral agreements between recipient countries and the United States.


In April 1948, the Marshall plan came into effect. During the implementation process, the United States' attitude of requiring recipient countries to implement additional conditions has never changed, and it is very tough. On May 13th Paul hoffman, the head of the oecd, made no secret of America's national self-interest in a senate appropriations committee hearing. "We are like bankers," he says. We might say, if you don't do that, we won't pay our dollars." Obviously, the "doing that" in hoffman's words actually requires western European countries to unconditionally accept and implement the aid strings proposed by the United States.


Among the many additional conditions of the Marshall plan, the most strategic one for the United States may be the provision of strategic reserve materials by the recipient countries to the United States. In response, on November 7, 1947, secretary of commerce evryl Harriman stated in the Harriman commission report that America's interests in Europe were not only economic but also strategic and political. That is to say, although the United States hopes to bring benefits to the American economy through the Marshall plan, it also hopes to restore the balance of power in Europe and strengthen the strategic security of the United States through the Marshall plan. Melvin leffler, a history professor at the university of Virginia, wrote in the U.S. journal diplomatic history: "what U.S. officials call national security is the control of European raw materials, industrial infrastructure, skilled labor, and military bases. In their view, the most fundamental strategic interest of the United States is to deter any potential adversary or ally, to mobilize European resources and economic and military potential against the United States for war purposes. Professor Emmanuel wexler of the university of Connecticut also pointed out that the United States had a premonition at the beginning of 1947 that it would assist Western Europe even out of the need of strategic reserve materials. In short, in order to obtain strategic supplies from Europe and prevent them from flowing into hostile countries of the United States and eventually becoming weapons against the United States, the United States must intervene in the post-war European affairs. And this kind of high concern of the United States on national security inevitably leads to the concern of the United States on the priority of aid delivery and strategic materials.